

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : Proposals to Overcome Reactive Analysis

Implications of Oil Discoveries in West Africa

The recent extensive discoveries of oil along the West African coast in the arc from the Ivory Coast to Angola will inevitably change the political and economic relationships of the countries of the area over the next three to five years as they become not only self sufficient in oil but exporters as well. These changes will have direct implications for American policy in that:

- The role of Nigeria as the lynchpin of the area will undergo substantial change.
- Countries other than Nigeria will now have the capability of buying arms in any market they choose and will therefore not be dependent on either West or East. (Cameroon has already given evidence of this.)
- They will be able to acquire technology for development from a wider array of market sources, including more extensive drawing on Latin America, particularly Brazil.
- These countries will become of substantially greater importance to Western Europe as sources of energy.
- A study of the implications of these developments could be done over a period of time, possibly by an outside contractor.

Zaire After Mobutu

The conventional wisdom has been that no immediate successor to Mobutu in Zaire is visible on the horizon as yet. This may be true, but he is not immortal. A speculative study of the future of Zaire under a variety of scenarios would be useful for long-range policy.

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- What is the most likely form that a movement to replace Mobutu might take? What are the real prospects of any likely successor?
- How strong are Soviet interests in Zaire and what are their capabilities for promoting a successor to Mobutu who would favor Soviet interests?
- The "systeme Mobutu" has kept him in power so far; without him what are the prospects for a viable economic future for Zaire?
- Zaire has only recently begun to look toward southern rather than central Africa as an axis of foreign policy. What are the prospects that Zaire could be integrated fully into a southern Africa development plan?
- These and other questions may not have any specific answers at the moment, but we should be speculating on the alternatives for American policy in preparation for an event that is bound to occur sooner rather than later.

Implications of Serious Internal Trouble in South Africa

2. To think the unthinkable, what if an uprising in South Africa, aided by outside forces, should succeed in overthrowing the white minority regime?

- What opportunities would this offer the Soviets for large-scale influence on all the independent countries of southern Africa? Obviously, these opportunities would depend on the ideological connections of a black African leadership. Can we make educated guesses about this?
- What are the prospects of the formation of an anti-US bloc in this area comprising roughly the area from Luanda to the Cape? What might be the effect of such a bloc on global American interests?

4. It can properly be argued that this turn of events is highly unlikely but so were the events in Iran thought to be. The point of addressing southern Africa in these terms is to force some serious speculation on what American policy can do either to prevent a South African upheaval or to cope with it should it come about. Such a study would require concentrated speculation on exactly what our long-range interests in the area are and how far we are prepared to go in defending them.

Import of South Africa Abandoning a Namibian Settlement

3. A more current issue concerns Namibia. What if the South Africans should simply opt out of a Namibian settlement entirely and decide to go it alone? Where would this leave American policy toward southern Africa as a whole?

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- The South Africans appear to believe that they have the capability to continue hostilities in northern Namibia for an indefinite length of time at a bearable cost. If they see that a Namibian settlement on any terms acceptable to the West is not in their interest, they may decide that it is no longer worth pursuing, particularly if the carrots offered by the U.S. for their cooperation are deemed insufficient.
- If Botha comes to the conclusion that a Namibian settlement is simply too costly in domestic political terms, he may well opt for a withdrawal from all negotiation, although the decision may not become public till some point in the future.
- A study of the options that such a decision may leave for the U.S. would be of direct policy interest.



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